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ABSTRACT 
Hungary's unique situation in the Kosovo crisis of 
1998/9 stemmed from the country's geographic and strategic 
position as the only NATO member adjacent to Yugoslavia; 
further important was the sensitivity regarding Belgrade's 
behavior 'toward the national minorities in Yugoslavia in 
view of the 350,000 ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina; 
finally, also vital was Hungary's briefest tenure in the 
Alliance before the onset of a severe crisis. The dilemma 
of Hungary at the end of the century approximates that, in 
a way, of Germany in the cold war. That is national 
division (of a kind) as well as being situated on the 
front-line of a conflict. 
Central and Eastern Europe has been the land of repressed 
national and ethnical conflicts for almost two centuries. 
These unresolved conflicts have meant constant threat to 
European security since the collapse of the communist bloc 
and still can endanger it. The primary objectives of 
Hungarian foreign policy after 1989 had been gaining 
membership in the EU and NATO and maintaining good 
relations with the bordering countries. The sheer irony of 
Hungary's participation in the Kosovo conflict is that 
having achieved one of its main objectives - joining NATO - 
it became a participant in the war against one of its 
neighbors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
" B e i n g  a g a t e w a y  t o  the B a l k a n s ,  H u n g a r y  was  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  
NATO ' s B a l k a n s  p o l i c i e s  ..." 
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor OrbAnl 
Just twelve days after the March 12, 1999 ceremony in 
Independence, Missouri, at which Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech Republic officially became members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organiz,ation, the Alliance launched its 
first air strikes against Yugoslavia*. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze some central 
aspects of Hungary's role in the resolution of the Kosovo 
conflict. Hungary's unique situation in the Kosovo crisis 
of 1998/9 stemmed from the country's geographic and 
strategic position as the only NATO member adjacent to 
Yugoslavia; its sensitivity regarding Belgrade's behavior 
towards the national minorities in Yugoslavia in view of 
the 350,000 ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina; and its 
briefest tenure in the Alliance. The dilemma of Hungary at 
the end of the century approximates that, in a way, of 
Germany in the cold war. That is national division (of a 
kind) as well as being situated on the front-line of a 
Viktor Orbdn's speech at NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Budapest 30 May 2000 
Available [Online] : http: //~-~?.mti.hu/english/ 131 May 20001 . 
conflict. Furthermore the pro-western orientation of the 
country after 1989 worsened the situation of the Hungarians 
outside of the present day borders, especially in the case 
of the Hungarian minorities living in Serbia. This 
situation approximates that of Germany, too. But Hungary 
cannot and will not pursue a policy of national unification 
without dreadful implications for all concerned, especially 
for those Hungarians living in BaEka-V~jvodina.~ 
Central and Eastern Europe has been the land of 
repressed national and ethnical conflicts for almost two 
centuries. These unresolved conflicts have meant constant 
threat to European security since the collapse of the 
communist bloc and still can endanger it. The thesis 
attempts to present the origins of these grievances and 
their present aspects. Additionally it will examine 
Hungary‘s involvement as one of the three newest members of 
the Alliance in ”Operation Allied Force” and deduce the 
implications for Hungary’s future role in the south-eastern 
European region and in NATO. It will present the Hungarian 
hopes and fears that were raised by the country’s entry 
into the Alliance as well as the main concerns of the 
* In my thesis I will refer the federation of Serbia and Montenegro as Yugoslavia. 
The area of Baeka and Vojvodina was ethnically cleansed of Germans after 1945, as a 
reprisal for Nazi policies toward the Serbs after 1941. 
members of NATO and Russia concerning Hungary’s membership. 
The thesis examines the effects of the Hungarian 
participation in the resolution of the Kosovo conflict 
concerning the above mentioned hopes and fears. It 
concludes that Hungary’s unique situation in the Alliance 
cannot be sustained though Hungary can play a special role 
in the troubled Balkans. 
3 
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11. BACKGROUND 
A. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE KOSOVO CAMPAIGN - WILL THE 
DOUBTS PERSIST? 
With its active involvement Hungary became a member of 
an allied military operation that aimed to prevent the 
further spreading of an ethnic conflict in the Balkans. In 
the process of NATO enlargement the most serious doubts 
about Hungary’s NATO membership concerned its unresolved 
ethnic minority based conflicts with the neighboring 
countries. An outspoken critic of NATO enlargement, Ted 
Galen Carpenter, had some particular examples of these 
worries. 
The decision to invite Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic to join NATO creates the prospect of U.S. 
involvement in an assortment of nasty ethnic disputes 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe. One of the 
proposed new members, Hungary, has long-standing 
problems with three of its neighbors because of 
discrimination against ethnic Hungarians living in those 
countries. Tensions are especially acute between Hungary 
and Serbia over Belgrade’s continuing mistreatment of 
Hungarian citizens in Serbia‘s province of Vojvodina.4 
The Hungarian governments after 1989 understood the 
significance of resolving these “nasty” conflicts, and 
signed basic treaties \\on good-neighborly relations and 
Carpenter, Ted Galen and Kislitsyn, Pavel. “NATO Expansion Flashpoint NO. 2 The Border 
between Hungary and Serbia.” C a t 0  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  B r i e f i n g  No. 45 (November 24. 1997) 
Available [Online]: http://wm.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-045es.html [19 November 19991. 
5 
friendly co-operation" with all the neighboring countries 
but Yugoslavia. NATO also tried to help these countries to 
get over their ethnically based conflicts through its 
Partnership for Peace Program providing an 
institutionalized framework for political and military 
cooperation for all member countries. The primary 
objectives of Hungarian foreign policy after 1989 had been 
gaining membership in the EU and NATO and maintaining good 
relations with the bordering countries, while supporting 
the minority rights of the ethnic Hungarian minorities in 
these countries in accordance with current European 
institutional standards. The sheer irony of Hungary's 
final effort in foreign politics is that having achieved 
one of its main objectives - joining NATO - it became a 
participant in the war against one of its neighbors, hence 
contradicting another major political objective, the 
nourishing of good neighborhood relations. 
The opponents of the NATO enlargement process had 
serious concerns about the effects of the expansion on the 
Alliance's cohesion and effectiveness as well.5 Maintaining 
the cohesion of the already 19-member-Alliance was one of 
the hardest tasks during the Kosovo operation, but these 
See: David S Yost, NATO transformed The A l l i a n c e ' s  New Roles  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
S e c u r i t y ,  pp. 117-118. 
6 
difficulties were scarcely caused by the new members. 
Although Hungary was in a particularly hard situation 
because of its proximity to the zone of the operations and 
the presence of 340,000 ethnic Hungarians in the heavily 
bombed Serbian province of Vojvodina, Budapest fulfilled 
all its NATO obligations. 
B. NATO AND THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM BOSNIA 
"The post-Cold War  euphoria w a s  succeeded by a per iod  t h a t  
brought disappointment and d i s i l l  usionment . 
This statement primarily applies to Central and 
Eastern Europe, but the most tragic fate in the region at 
the end of the 20th century fell to the nations of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, unlike those of 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, resulted in several 
bloody wars among the former constituent republics. The 
longest and probably the bloodiest of these wars took place 
in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. The hesitation of the United 
Nations, the United States, the European Union and NATO to 
Address by H. E. Mr. Janos Martonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Hungary United Nations General Assembly Fifty-third session General Debate Available 
[Online] : 
chttp://mw.mfa.qov.hu/l999/Martonyi beszed/mjensz980929e.html> [Nov 28 19991. 
7 
intervene effectively in this conflict cost thousands of 
lives. "Long after he had left Belgrade, Ambassador 
Zimmermann reflected on the tragedy: 'The refusal of the 
Bush administration to commit American power early was our 
greatest mistake of the entire Yugoslav crisis. It made an 
unjust outcome inevitable and wasted the opportunity to 
save over a hundred thousand lives."'? The final decision 
of the us to use considerable force in operat ion conducted 
with its NATO allies stopped the killings firmly and 
provided a chance to develop a feasible peace agreement.' 
The lack of consensus among the leading powers inside the 
Alliance considerably delayed this process: "NATO could not 
intervene effectively to stop hostilities in Bosnia until 
the main Western powers, eventually led by the United 
States, finally agreed in 1995 to do so..."'. The intensified 
NATO presence and commitment made it clear that the Balkans 
had become strategically important, at least as a possible 
serious trouble spot. Finally the negative experiences of 
troops from NATO nations in the United Nations peacekeeping 
mission - UNPROFOR - under an ineffective UN leadership 
Holbrooke, R . ,  To End a War, p. 27, R a n d o m  House New York, 1998. 
' Holbrooke argues: "Had the United States not intervened, the war would have continued 
for years and ended disastrously." Holbrooke, R., To End a War, p. 350 ,  R a n d o m  House New 
York, 1998. 
' D a v i d  S Yost, NATO transformed T h e  Alliance's N e w  R o l e s  in International Security, 
275. 
8 
made the political and military leaders of NATO more 
reluctant to subordinate their forces to UN control. 
Richard Holbrooke, the chief mediator of the Dayton 
Agreement that ended the Bosnian war, refers to the post- 
Yugoslav wars as “the greatest collective security failure 
of the West since the 1930s.” He states: 
Yugoslavia undeniably represented a failure of 
historic dimensions. Why and how had it 
happened-and just at the moment of the West’s 
great triumph over communism? There was, of 
course, no single, or simple, answer. But five 
major factors helped explain the tragedy: first, 
a misreading of Balkan history; second, the end 
of the Cold War; third, the behavior of the 
Yugoslav leaders themselves; fourth, the 
inadequate American response to the crisis; and, 
finally, the mistaken belief of the Europeans 
that they could handle their first post-Cold War 
challenge on their own. 
The Yugoslavia crisis should have been handled by 
NATO, the Atlantic institution that mattered 
most, the one in which the United States was the 
core member. The best chance to prevent war 
would have been to present the Yugoslavs with a 
clear warning that NATO airpower would be used 
against any party that tried to deal with the 
ethnic tensions of Yugoslavia by force.10 
C. CONSTITUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 
Yugoslavia and its predecessors were formed on the 
ruins of two empires - the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg 
Empire - during the l g t h  and 20th centuries. The origins of 
the Serb-Yugoslav statehood go back to the 12 th  century when 
lo Holbrooke, R., To End a War, pp. 21-28, Random House New York, 1998. 
9 
the Kingdom of Serbia was established. The mediaeval 
history of the Serb state was terminated in 1459, when 
after several defeats Serbia came under Ottoman rule, which 
lasted until 1867. Having been freed from Ottoman rule the 
Serbs soon found themselves in the sphere of influence of 
another power, the Habsburg Empire. Serbia's independence 
was recognized by the great powers at the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878 but it was challenged by the Austro- 
Hungarian expansion into the Balkans. The annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908 escalated the 
tensions, which culminated in the assassination of the heir 
to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
in Sarajevo in 1914. The Austro-Hungarian government held 
Serbia responsible for the assassination and declared war, 
hence starting World War I.ll 
The peace treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon which 
the allied powers signed with Austria and Hungary after the 
end of the Great War12 annexed the South-Slav-inhabited 
territories to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
which later was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The 
issue between Croats and Serbs in the late lgth century was 
~ 
There are more factors and actors which eventually led to the start of the Great War - 
but obviously the assassination "triggered" the outbreak of international hostilities. 
British public, politics, and academics mostly refer to WWI as the "Great War". 
10 
in part a reaction against the expansion of Habsburg rule. 
In the case of the Croats and Serbs under the rule of the 
Hungarian half of the empire after 1867, this idea formed a 
reaction to Magyarization and the manner in which the 
empire was run in the face of a pan-Slavic ideal espoused, 
in part, by Serbs and Croats, but with Russian sponsorship 
at the expense of Vienna and Budapest especially in the 
years before 1914. In the years until 1919, the Croats 
came to embrace a kind of federative ideal, while certain 
Serbs embraced centralizing, imperial ambitions on the 
model of what was believed to have existed in antiquity or 
the medieval period. The construction of the kingdom of 
Slovenes, Serbs and Croats underwent greater stress in the 
middle inter war period with pressure from the Italians 
(against the Slovenes) as well as that of Greece, such 
that, once the Mussolini regime established itself by the 
middle of the 1920s, the Italians promoted Croat 
separatism-federative strivings in Yugoslavia at the 
expense of the Belgrad royal regime. This support promoted 
Croat terrorists who assassinated the King of the Serbs and 
the French Foreign Minister in Marseilles in 1934. This 
syndrome then underwent a violent and disastrous escalation 
in 1941, when the Axis powers dismembered Yugoslavia and 
11 
the Croats sought to annihilate Serbs in their newly 
created Axis nation. Serbia fell under German control and 
Vojvodina also had a significant German population (Donau 
Schwaben) in addition to Hungarians and Slovaks. All of 
these powers, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia - on the Axis 
side until 1944 - had to give way to the onrush of Soviet 
power which was aided by the Serbian partisans under Tito. 
The latter embraced something of the lost ideal of a 
Southern-Slav federative polity in which the peoples on the 
periphery had a degree of constitutional autonomy and the 
legacy of the ethnic violence of the era 1941-1945 was 
ruthlessly suppressed via a policy of carrot and stick.13 
Tito’s Yugoslavia constituted six republics - Serbia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia - and two autonomous provinces - Vojvodina and 
Kosovo. The peoples of the Southern-Slav federation in its 
form that emerged by the 1960s managed to live happily with 
one another and in a state of peace that drew the 
admiration of the West. In this connection, Tito created a 
kind of domestic and external peace via the idea of the 
non-aligned movement of the 1 9 5 0 s  and 1960s that elevated 
l3 See: Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 (Cambridge, 1945) ; 
Ivan Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II 
(Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1998) 
12 
Yugoslavia's status in the European constellation of the 
cold war, while it secured the generous economic support of 
the west to create the impression of a higher standard of 
living than might have been found elsewhere in the 
communist east. 
This system could not long endure beyond the death of 
its creator in 1980, especially amid the general 
transformation of diplomacy, economy and society of Europe 
that crystallized by the end of the 1980s. The following 
disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia was followed by a series of local wars among the 
former constituent republics. Finally Croatia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent states, 
while Serbia and Montenegro formed a new federal state, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
The history of the South-Slav unity was filled with 
episodic fighting between the Serbs and the other 
nationalities - mainly the Croats . -  for and against Serb 
domination. Serbia as the first to gain sovereignty always 
tried to monopolize the leadership in every aspect of the 
political and social sphere. The centuries long desire to 
establish Great-Serbia fulfilled their destiny in the Wars 
of Yugoslav Succession of 1991-95. Serbia and its 
13 
nationalist leader, Slobodan Milosevic played for high 
stakes and lost a lot. Not only were they not able to 
unite the Serb-inhabited territories of the former 
Yugoslavia, but the once joking matter of the “Great 
Belgrade nightmare” i.e. Serbia without Kosovo and 
Vojvodina left alone by Montenegro, may become reality. 
D. YUGOSLAV-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS AFTER 1989 
At the end of the Cold War the situation in Yugoslavia 
and Hungary had many similar aspects. Both countries had 
severe economic problems - practically they were both in 
deep economic crises, though the causes of the crises were 
somewhat different. Beyond the economic crises there were 
political crises in both countries as well. The ruling 
communist parties could no longer maintain their absolute 
control over the societies, and they were forced to allow 
multi-party elections, which were held in 1989 in Hungary 
and in 1990 in Yugoslavia. However the two elections had 
different effects; Hungary started to build a Western-type 
democratic society, while in Yugoslavia the appearance of 
nationalist-separatist movements caused the bloody 
disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
14 
The Wars of Yugoslav Succession had several serious 
effects on Hungary. First of all it intensified the 
feeling of insecurity in the Hungarian public, and 
contributed to the so-called "security vacuum", which had 
already evolved. 
Hungary is nervous. With the permission of the 
government in Budapest, its airspace is being 
used by Nato's AWACS surveillance planes 
monitoring the Bosnian no-fly zone. It has a 
long border with Croatia and Serbia, and is thus 
i'nvolved in the international sanctions against 
Serbia, which are also affecting its own economy. 
In the Serbian province of Vojvodina and in Serb- 
occupied Croatia there are some 400,000 ethnic 
Hungarians who could fall victim to a new 
outbreak of "ethnic cleansing". Within Hungary 
itself, there are understandable fears of cross- 
border punitive air raids by Serbian planes, and 
eventually of Serbian expansi~nism.~~ 
I However Hungary's above mentioned contribution to the 
NATO actions during the Bosnia conflict - Hungary allowed 
the use of the Hungarian airspace for the NATO aircraft, 
participating in the enforcement of the UN Security Council 
resolution 781 (1992) and 816 (1993) - provided a public I 
sense of some quasi security guarantees, which reduced the 
level of feeling insecure. 
l4 "Hungary Puts NATO on the Spot." The Independent (London), May 18 1993. 
Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/MAJPAP (HUNGARY AND SECURITY VACUUM AND WAR AND 
YUGOSLAVIA) [March 25 20001. 
15 
Another effect was the UN sanctioned economic embargo 
against the FRY, which caused considerable losses to the 
Hungarian economy. 
Hungary is banking on UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali to rubber stamp a Security 
Council recommendation, which would pave the way 
for Budapest being compensated for trade losses 
as a result of the embargo against Yugoslavia. 
The UN recommendation, which is expected to go 
before the Secretary General shortly, does not 
mean that Hungary would get financial 
compensation from the United Nations itself. The 
UN Security Council in its recommendation, urges 
!!immediate help" for Hungary, and calls on the 
member countries and UN financial institutions to 
investigate ways of providing aid. The Council 
also urges compensation for Bulgaria, Romania and 
Ukraine, which like Hungary share borders with 
Yugoslavia.16 
Hungary's main concern towards the Yugoslav wars was 
caused by the Hungarian ethnic minorities living in 
Serbia's Vojvodina region. Since these wars were generated 
by overheated nationalism the ethnic Hungarians could have 
been easily involved. 
Given what Serbs have been up to elsewhere in 
former Yugoslavia, Hungary has reason to fear for 
the safety of the 300,000 or so ethnic Hungarians 
in Vojvodina. But so far it has been content to 
use only diplomatic pressure to advertise its 
concerns. Should "ethnic cleansing" spread to 
l5 The Washington Times reported that according to official estimates Hungary lost 1.2 
billion dollars in trade and transshipment of goods to Yugoslavia. November 16, 1993. 
l6 Inter Press Service, July 9 1993. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/MAJPAP (HUNGARY 
ANDYUGOSLAVIA AND EMBARGO) [March 25 20001. 
16 
Vojvodina, Hungary’s government would come under 
extreme pressure to act.17 
Hungary’s security had already been affected by the 
relatively huge inflow of refugees during the preceding 
years before the Yugoslav wars and it was further 
endangered by the mass war refugee influx. “Over the past 
six years Hungarians have witnessed the arrival, in rapid 
succession, of several large groups of refugees from 
neighbouring countries, most of whom could neither return 
to their homelands nor move to the West. Together with 
illegal aliens, these people have burdened Hungary at a 
time when it was undergoing both major political change and 
economic strain.”18 According to the estimation of the 
Hungarian authorities some 70,000 refugees fled to Hungary 
between 1991 and 1993 because of the Yugoslav crisis.19 
The post Cold War Yugoslav-Hungarian relations were 
worsened by one more important event, the Hungarian- 
Croatian arms transfer scandal. During the initial phase 
of the break up of Yugoslavia, Hungary transferred small 
arms to Croatia, which were used to arm the Croatian 
paramilitary and police forces, which Belgrade regarded as 
l7 The Economist December 25 1993. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/MAJPAP (HUNGARY 
AND ETHNIC MINORITIES ANDYUGOSLAVIA) [March 28 20001. 
Pataki, J. “The Recent History of the Hungarian Refugee Problem“ RFE/RL Research 
Report 17 June 1994. p. 34. 
17 
a hostile step. "Belgrade has already condemned Hungary 
for shipping 30,000 Kalashnikov rifles to Croatia. A 
videotape of Croatia's former defence minister finalising 
that deal with Hungarian oEf icials was broadcast on 
Belgrade television earlier this year before the army put 
him on trial in absentia."" 
Summing up, the post 1989 relations between Yugoslavia 
and Hungary were quite overloaded by the tensions of the 
conflicts in the former SFRY. Since Hungary had some 
serious disputes over the ethnic Hungarians with Slovakia 
and Rumania too, the Hungarian foreign policy's efforts to 
normalize Hungary's relations with its neighbors were 
absolutely reasonable. 
E. KOSOVO AND VOJVODINA - SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
Kosovo and Vojvodina are legally the two newest 
provinces of Serbia.21 Although Kosovo is considered to be 
the historical heart of Serbia, officially it became part 
l9 Ibid. p. 36. 
Sunday T i m e s ,  September 1 1991. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/WORLD/ALLNWS/NONENG 
(HUNGARY AND CROATIA AND ARMS TRANSFER) [April 15 20001. 
Several scholars claim that these two provinces legally never belonged to Serbia, but 
Yugoslavia. "(In fact Vojvodina had never belonged to Serbia, having joined the Yugoslav 
kingdom in 1918; and at the level of legal theory, as we have seen, Kosovo had also been 
incorporated into the Yugoslav kingdom, and not into the previous Serbian one.)" 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short H i s t o r y ,  p. 329, New York University Press, 1998. 
18 
of it only in 1912 . 2 2  Vo j vodina belonged to the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire until the end of World War I when the 
territory of Vojvodina was annexed by the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which later was renamed the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After the Second World War, within 
the new state, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 
the two had an "autonomous Province" status. 
Historically the seat of the medieval Serb 
kingdom, Kosovo was only liberated from Turkish 
rule by the Serb Army in 1912, when Albanians, 
predominantly Muslim, were the majority 
population. Attempts at colonisation between the 
two World Wars failed to shift the ethnic balance 
in the Serbs' favour. When federal Yugoslavia 
was proclaimed in 1945, KOSOVO, by virtue of its 
ethnic Albanian majority, became first an 
autonomous region and then an autonomous 
province. Decentralisation of Yugoslavia, 
culminating in the 1974 constitution, which 
transferred considerable power from the 
federation to constituent republics, produced a 
political hybrid. Kosovo (and the northern 
province of Vojvodina) nominally remained part of 
Serbia, but enjoyed all rights of constituent 
republics but one: in accordance with Leninist 
principles, the right to secede was explicitly 
granted to republics, but not to provinces. 
Although not formally a republic, Kosovo ran its 
22 Noel Malcolm argues that though Serbia conquered Kosovo in 1912-13, but legally never 
annexed it. "When Kosovo was conquered in 1912-13, Serbia was operating under its 
constitution of 1903. Article Four of that constitution clearly states that no change to 
the frontiers of Serbia can be valid unless it has been agreed by the Grand National 
Assembly - not the 'Ordinary Assembly' or parliament, but a special enlarged assembly 
summoned to deal with constitutional matters. No such Grand National Assembly was ever 
convened to discuss o r  ratify the extension of Serbia's borders to include Kosovo and 
Macedonia. Kosovo was not incorporated into Serbia by the standards of international law 
either." Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, pp. 264-265, New York University Press, 
1998. 
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own affairs, with full veto powers in the federal 
sys tem . 23 
The two provinces are the ethnically least Serbian 
within Serbia, though in contrast with Kosovo, Vojvodina 
has a 60 per cent Serbian ethnic majority. "But here the 
similarities end. Unlike Kosovo where the Albanians 
represented a clear-cut 90 percent majority, Vojvodina 
itself is a patchwork of ethnic groups - Serbs, Hungarians, 
Slovaks, Romanians, Croats etc. The largest non-Serbian 
group, the Hungarians, comprises only some 17 percent of 
the province's population. "24 According to the 1991 census 
results the non-Serb population of the province reached 47 
per cent and included over 3 5 0 , 0 0 0  Hungarians, 78,000 
Croatians, 67,000 Slovenians, 47,000 Montenegrins, 2 5 , 0 0 0  
Romanians, 20 ,000  Ukrainians and other non-Serb groups. 
These numbers are constantly changing as more and more 
Serbs are moving into Vojvodina, they have already tipped 
the long standing but fragile ethnic balance of the region. 
The similarities in KOSOVO'S and Vojvodina's legal status 
did not mean similar economic conditions. Moreover there 
is a great economic disparity between the two regions; 
23 Kusovac, 2. "Different r e a l i t i e s  wres t le  fo r  Kosovo" Jane's Intelligence Review Sep 1 
1998. p. 15. 
24 
Available [Online] : ch t tp :  //wdw. c d i  .orq/weekl:f/l999/issue29 .html> [12 December 19991 . 
"Hungarian Steps and Missteps i n  Kosovo." Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 3 Issue # 29 
2 0  
Vojvodina is the most prosperous area of Yugoslavia, 
whereas Kosovo has been the poorest. 
The autonomous status of the two provinces was 
annulled in 1989 with the amendment of the Serbian 
constitution. Following the loss  of their autonomy the 
political objectives of the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina 
and the moderate ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were similar - 
to regain their autonomous rights. The methods they chose 
were different; the ethnic Hungarians participated in the 
political life of Serbia, while the ethnic Albanians 
boycotted every form of co-operation with the Serbian 
authorities. The plans on the future status of Kosovo had 
their influence on the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, and 
even on the Hungarian politicians. The most extreme 
example of this interlocking thinking was the demand of the 
chairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party for 
Vojvodina’ s independence from Serbia. 
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111. EUROPE AND THE MINORITY ISSUE 
A. ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL MINORITY CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL- 
EUROPEz5 
The treatment of ethnic minorities has been a 
sensitive issue all over Europe and particularly in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Europe’s geographical characteristics, 
but far more historic events and rather accidental “border- 
drawing” produced a map of fragmented ethnic groups all 
over the continent. During the era of the re-birth of the 
national feelings in the 18th and 19th century the territory 
of Central and South-East Europe was occupied by two great 
empires, the Habsburg and the Ottoman. The turning point 
in the history of modern nationalism in Europe was the 
French revolution. Its ideas spread all over Europe 
generating the necessary spiritual excitement for changes 
in the societies. The first events that really shook the 
central and south-eastern part of Europe were the 
revolutions of 1848, which in several cases connected the 
awakening nationalism of the nations with demands for 
independence. 
25 On general development of nationalism see: Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Oxford, 1983) ; Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, 1955) ; 
Hagen Schulze, Staat und Nation in der detuschen Europaeischen Geschichte Munich, 1994) ; 
Idem. Nation Building in Central Europe (Leamington Spa. 1985), 
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The Revolution of 1848 in Central Europe marked 
the awakening of various peoples to national 
consciousness. Other Central European peoples 
who agitated for national independence in 1848 
include the Poles, whose territory was divided 
among Russia, Germany, and Austriaz6; the Czechs 
and the Hungarians, subjects of the Austrian 
monarchy; and the Christian peoples living in the 
Balkan Peninsula under the rule of the Turkish 
sultan. z7 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning 
of the lgth century started at its peripheries. Serbia as 
the northernmost part of the empire began to push seriously 
for independence in 1812 and attained it in September of 
1829; Serbian nationalism was a main driving force in this 
process. Gaining quasi independence from the Ottoman 
Empire the Serbs turned their face towards their still 
suppressed fellow-nations living in the Habsburg Empire. 
The majority of the Jugo-Slav peoples of Europe, 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, lived 
under foreign domination. The Austrian 
Slovenians under German, the Serb immigrants of 
Hungary under Magyar, the Dalmatian Slavs under 
Italian, the Slavs of the Balkans under Turkish 
rule as subject peoples, without the leadership 
of a national historical class, without a state 
life or local self-government. Only the Croats 
were successful in safeguarding their state life 
and historical continuity to a certain extent.z8 
One has to reconsider that at that time neither Germany nor Austria as known right now 
did exist as nation states. 
z7 "Nationalism, 'I Microsof t@ EncartaO Online Encyclopedia 2000 Available [Online] : 
chttp://encarta.msn.com> [April 28 20001. 
Jaszi, O . ,  "The D i s s o l u t i o n  of the  Habsburg Monarchy" 4 0 3 - 4 .  
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Being the first among them to achieve independence, the 
Serbs became the vanguard fighters of the South-Slav unity . 
The new obstacle in their way was formed by the Habsburg 
Empire. Hence the awakening nationalism of the Southern- 
Slavs and of the other "nations without historyffz9 became 
the principal cause of the decline of the Habsburg Empire 
as well. 
Beginning approximately with the end of the eighteenth 
century a new social force appears which, originating 
from small rivulets, became in several decades the 
torrent of a powerful stream which undermined more and 
more the spirit and institutions of the dynastico- 
patrimonial state. This force was the modern national 
feeling in the name of which each nation of the 
monarchy, great and small, laid claim to self- 
expression and local administration, and, several of 
them, to an independent state life.30 
In addition to the appearance of national feelings the 
economic and social conflicts between the classes appeared 
in "national camouflage". 
This process of evolution had inevitably a 
national reaction. The serfs began to think more 
critically concerning their own situation. The 
economic and political pressure of feudal society 
2 9  " ... those people, which like the Slovenians, the Ruthenians, the Jugo-Slavs under the 
Turkish conquests, or the Czechs under Austrian absolutism had lost their former 
nobility, either because their leading classes were exterminated or because they were 
assimilated by a new aristocracy. These nations remained, through the lack of an 
intellectual leading class, 'nations without history, ' they did not have a conscious role 
in the respective countries, but, purely as peasant and bondsmen masses, they continued 
throughout centuries a stagnant, vegetative life as passive instruments of a foreign 
nobility. They became not real nations but simple Bedientvolker, servant-peoples, the 
language of which lived only as a despised dialect in the backyard slum quarters of the 
landlords." Jaszi, O., "The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy" 249. 
30 Jaszi, O., "The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy" 248. 
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was felt as a national exploitation. The Czech, 
the Slovak, the Rumanian, the Rhutenian, and the 
other masses of bondsmen identified the system of 
feudal oppression with the national oppression 
exercised by the German, Hungarian, or Polish 
upper classes. The rebellions of the serfs very 
often took on national hue. On the other hand 
the fear and hatred of the privileged classes 
against the revolting serfs assumed the form of 
national prej~dice.~~ 
After 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the 
suppression of the nationalities living in the Hungarian 
part of the Empire gained new form, the form of artificial 
"magyarization". Since the Hungarians/Magyars were always 
a minority they tried to switch the ratio by a forced 
assimilation of the non-Magyar population. Magyarization 
took place through different forms: through education 
mainly in Hungarian, through the local administration, 
through the "antiquated and corrupt electoral system" - 
"the most reactionary system of 
There were also other methods which were applied 
in order to build up a unitary Magyar state. 
Such were: the Magyarization of village names 
even in regions where there was practically no 
Magyar-speaking population; the Magyarization of 
family names which was in many cases the 
expression of sincere loyalty but later it was 
extended by governmental pressure in order to 
manifest the Magyar character of the state before 
foreign public opinion; Magyar agricultural 
colonization in the midst of compact nationality 
31 Jaszi, O., "The Dissolution of the  Habsburg Monarchy" 253. 
32 Jaszi, O., "The Dissolution of the  Habsburg Monarchy" 332-3 
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settlements which had naturally no other result 
than the assimilation of these Magyar islets in 
the sea of the nationalities; the distribution of 
Magyar nobility which had a great prestige value, 
especially among those who tried to be accepted 
by the gentry.33 
As an Austrian scholar, Joseph Redlich, noted:" 
In the whole history of the nineteenth century - 
omitting the oppressions of the Poles by the 
Russians - there was scarcely a second example of 
such a comprehensive and premeditated denial and 
annihilation of all legal enactments and 
procedures concerning the majority of the total 
population of the country, disregarding the 
political rights and privileges accorded by law 
by the Magyars to the nationalities, than that 
carried on by the Magyar upper classes and rulers 
of the country since 1867, against all their 
citizens of foreign tongue and culture.34 
Hungary had to pay a high price for this subjection of 
the non-Magyar nationalities after World War I, when two 
third of its territory and more than half of its population 
was annexed according to the provisions of the Trianon 
Treaty. Furthermore about 5 million Magyars became 
citizens of the successor states, hence becoming national 
minorities. The treatment of these Magyars was similar or 
the same as it had been practiced before the war by them. 
The fate of these Magyar nationalities gave birth to the 
continuous revisionist efforts between the two world wars, 
33 
34 
J a s z i ,  O . ,  "The D i s s o l u t i o n  of the Habsburg Monarchy" 3 3 6 .  
J a s z i ,  O . ,  "The D i s s o l u t i o n  of  the Habsburg Monarchy" 336-7. 
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but after a temporary re-annexation of some of these 
territories during the Second World War, they remained 
outside of their "mother country". 
B. COMPREHENSIVE POLICIES TOWARDS THE NATIONAL MINORITIES 
Efforts to protect the rights of the ethnic minorities 
appeared on the political agenda of the various nation 
states almost immediately after the peace treaties of World 
War I (Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and 
Sevres) . But a real codification of the protection of 
ethnic minority rights has been taking place only after the 
Second World War under the auspices of the United Nations, 
the Council of Europe and the Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) . The most important documents 
of this process are: the United Nations Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1966), especially Articles 26 and 27; 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(1992); the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (1992) and the Framework Convention on the 
Protection of the National Minorities (1995) by the Council 
of Europe. These documents set standards for states on the 
treatment and behavior towards their ethnic minorities. 
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The Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly 
constantly monitor observance of these regulations and make 
further recommendations. Hungary is deeply interested in 
this process since "the Hungarian state and nation are not 
confined within the same borders, which requires increased 
responsibility on the part of Hungary."35 An unfortunately 
misinterpreted version of this responsibility was the 
infamous declaration in 1990 by the then Hungarian Prime 
Minister, Jozsef Antall, who wanted to become "in spirit" 
the Prime Minister of all the 15 million Hungarians. His 
statement was a reference to the 4.5 million ethnic 
Hungarians in neighboring countries, who had become foreign 
citizens after the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty. Because of 
its resemblance to the post World War I pan-Magyarist 
slogans Antall's speech caused negative feelings in the 
neighboring countries and all over the world. 
In the current atmosphere of rabid nationalism 
and Western tolerance of forced border changes in 
the Balkans, suspicions have soared in the 
countries surrounding Hungary that it may seek 
the kind of ethnic reunion being brutally 
accomplished by the Serbs. Suspicions that 
Hungary wants its empire back have been rife 
since March, 1990, when late Prime Minister 
Jozsef Antall declared his aim of working for the 
interests of all 15 million Hungarians.36 
35 Government Programme for a Civic Hungary on the Eve of a New Millenium Available 
[Online] : http://wm.htmh.hu/govpr-frame.htm [6 December 19991 . 
36 "Ethnic Tension Poses Threat to Hungarians" Los Angeles T i m e s ,  January 7 1994. 
Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/WORLD/NONENG/ (Antall and 15 million) [16 May 20001. 
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The response of the Slovak, Rumanian and Serb 
politicians and public was harsh, but the fears were 
compensated later by the so-called basic treaties between 
Hungary and all its neighbors but Yugoslavia. Since then 
the Hungarian foreign policy’s main task is to stand for 
the rights of the Hungarian ethnic minorities living in the 
neighboring countries in cooperation with their ”home 
countries. ” 
30 
IV. THE KOSOVO CRISIS OF 1998-1999 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT 
Kosovo, the southwestern province of Serbia, is 
historically the oldest part of Serbia. It is a “holy 
land” for the Serbs arguing that their ancestors settled 
there in the 7th century. KOSOVO’S landscape is thoroughly 
dotted by monuments of Serbian history and by shrines of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church. Kosovo Polje was the site of 
the famous battle of 1389, where the Ottoman army defeated 
the Serbs. The battle of Kosovo became a part of the 
Serbian national myth in the lgth century, a symbol of the 
struggle for freedom and independen~e.~’ 
The population of the province was multi-ethnic in 
almost every period of history. The most important 
ethnicity besides the Serbs was the Albanian. Their 
ancestors, the Illyrians, had inhabited the territory of 
Kosovo before the arrival of the Serbs. During the Ottoman 
occupation the Albanians gradually out-numbered the Serbs 
and they became a permanent segment of the population. As 
the Ottoman Empire became more and more “the sick man of 
Europe” the Albanians living in the empire tried to get rid 
37 
outstanding event in Serbian history. 
President Milosevic celebrated the 600-year-anniversary of the 1389 battle as the most 
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of the Ottoman rule more and more forcefully. There were 
several uprisings between 1908 and 1912 and finally they 
forced the Turkish government to accept the “Fourteen 
Points of Hasan Prishtina” and Istanbul agreed to form an 
Albanian quasi-state within the empire.38 Having not been 
able to repress the Albanian uprising the weakness of the 
Ottoman Empire was unfolded. “In the end, like Samson in 
the Temple of Gaza, they pulled down the columns of the 
Ottoman Empire upon on their own head. It was the 
Albanians and not the Serbs or Bulgars or Greeks who 
defeated the Turks.”)’ Realizing the fatal weakness of the 
Ottoman Empire, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro 
formed an anti-Ottoman alliance and Montenegro declared war 
on the Ottoman Empire on 18 October 1912, starting the 
First Balkan War. During the war, Serbia occupied the 
territory of Kosovo and by the terms of the Treaty of 
London of 1913 annexed it.40 But they could not enjoy their 
new possession for a long time. During World War I 
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria occupied Kosovo. After the 




an independent Albanian state. 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, pp. 246-248, New York University Press, 1998. 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, p. 249, New York University Press, 1998. 
Meanwhile to prevent Serbia’s excessive strengthening the Great Powers agreed to form 
province in 1918, and took it as an integral part of the 
Serbian Kingdom to the new state of "The Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes". Almost immediately they started a 
colonization campaign in the province, sending Serb 
settlers there and denying any special rights to the 
Albanians, even denying the existence of an Albanian 
population in Kosovo. 41 The colonization process was 
planned to change the national composition of the 
population in KOSOVO, increasing the ratio of the Serbs in 
the province by granting them land, and driving the 
Albanians away. 
The colonization programme was a complex 
phenomenon, serving a variety of aims: the 
overriding, long-term purpose was to change the 
national composition of the population in Kosovo 
(and in Macedonia, which was also colonized), but 
other factors were also involved. One such 
factor was a desire to stop the overflow of 
people from Serbia and Montenegro who were 
emigrating to North America, by offering them 
grants of free land closer to home. Another was 
the policy of punishing the kaCaks by 
confiscating their property: the most effective 
way of enforcing this punishment was to give 
their land to new settlers. Security policy also 
influenced the general pattern of location of the 
colonies: new villages of Serbian or Montenegrin 
settlers were concentrated strategically along 
the main communication routes, and efforts were 
made (not very successfully) to establish such 
41 "A statement drawn up by the Yugoslav delegation at the League of Nations, in response 
to Albanian criticisms in 1929, plainly said: 'Our position has always been that in our 
southern regions, which have been integral parts of our state or were annexed to our 
Kingdom before 1 January 1919, there are no national minorities. That position is still 
our last word on the question of the recognition of minorities in Southern Serbia.'" 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, p. 268, New York University Press, 1998. 
33 
colonies in the sensitive border area adjoining 
Albania. (...) As a Serbian policy of the previous 
year (1937) noted: ’This is below the minimum for 
subsistence. But that is and has been our aim: 
to make their life impossible, and in that way to 
force them to emigrate. ’ 4 2  
The short-term result of colonization was a measurable 
increase in the ratio of the Serbs, but to dramatically 
change that, they needed more extreme plans. 
The total number of colonists who came to Kosovo 
was just over 13,000 families: perhaps 70,000 
people altogether, equivalent to more than ten 
per cent of KOSOVO’S entire population. Writing 
in 1928, the Serbian official Djordje KrstiC 
described the colonization programme as a great 
’success’ in demographic terms: whereas, he said, 
’we’ were only 24 per cent of the population of 
Kosovo in 1919, the figure had now risen to 38 
per cent. (...) One member of the club (Serbian 
Cultural Club in Belgrade), Orestije KrstiC, 
proposed: ’The land must be bought from the 
Albanians, but of course only when it cannot be 
taken from them without compensation’ ; another, 
Djoka Perina, thought it necessary to create a 
67,5 per cent majority of Serbs in ’Southern 
Serbia’, for which purpose he advocated 
introducing 470,000 colonists and expelling 
300,000 Albanians.43 
Plans for the total expulsion of the Albanians 
might seem at first sight to have belonged to the 
realm of pure fantasy; but fantasy came very 
close to becoming a reality. From 1933 onwards 
there were serious discussions between the 
Yugoslav and Turkish governments over the 
deportation to Turkey of huge numbers of Muslim 
Albanians. (...) the text of an intergovernmental 
agreement was eventually drawn up, and initialled 
on 11 July 1938. According to this agreement, 
42 
43 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, pp. 278-283, New York University Press, 1998. 
Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, pp. 2 8 2 - 2 8 4 ,  New York University Press, 1998. 
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Turkey would take 40,000 families, at a price of 
500 Turkish pounds per family: a family was 
defined as ‘blood relations under one roof’, 
which in the Kosovo countryside would include 
many three-generation households of more then ten 
members. (...) The entire process was meant to 
take six years, from 1939 to 1944. Fortunately 
for the Albanians of KOSOVO, the Second World War 
prevented it from ever coming into effect.44 
After the Second World War Serbia became a member of 
the Federation of the Socialist Republics of Yugoslavia, 
and Kosovo and Vojvodina as provinces of Serbia gained 
autonomous status in 1974.45 In 1989 Slobodan Milosevic, 
then the First Secretary of the Serbian Communist Party, 
annulled the autonomous status of both provinces. By that 
time the proport ion of the Albanian population in Kosovo 
exceeded 80 percent. Deprived of their autonomy, the 
Albanians chose the method of passive resistance against 
the Serbs. A shadow state was established inside the 
borders of KOSOVO, with its own administration, education, 
taxation and police. The spiritual leader of the non- 
violent resistance was Ibrahim Rugova, president of the 
shadow-state and chairman of the Democratic League of 
Kosova. Rugova’s policy seemed to be unsuccessful, and 
44 Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, pp. 285-286, New York University Press, 1998. 
45 “...many Serbs had always resented the existence of the two autonomous provinces, 
regarding their creation as some sort of punitive truncation of Serbia by the half-Croat, 
half-Slovene Josip Broz Tito.“ Malcolm, N., Kosovo A Short History, p. 329, New York 
University Press, 1998. 
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from 1996 several intellectuals and politicians challenged 
the non-violent tactics. The most radical opposition 
group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started an armed 
campaign for the independence of KOSOVO, which grew into a 
full-scale guerrilla war. 
As an answer to the KLA's actions the Serbian 
authorities started the systematic expulsion of ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo. In 1998, however, ethnic Albanians 
composed 90 per cent of the population in Kosovo. 
B. NATO's DECISIONS AND ACTIONS CONCERNING THE 1998-99 
KOSOVO CRISIS 
During the atrocities in 1998 in Kosovo, NATO, having 
"learned from the lessons" of Bosnia, showed greater 
readiness to intervene in the conflict. After several 
months of violence and atrocities against the unarmed 
ethnic Albanians by the Serbian security forces, NATO 
decided to intervene and to stop an apparent act of 
genocide. 
When NATO launched its air campaign, the 
situation in Kosovo was one of rising ethnic 
violence, suppression of democracy, a breakdown 
of law and order, systematic human rights abuses 
by the ruling authorities, and a refusal by the 
Belgrade government to seek, or accept, a 
political solution. At the same time, there was 
evidence that the government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was planning to escalate 
its campaign of repression. The international 
36 
community could see a humanitarian disaster 
looming. 4 6  
After an open threat to bomb Yugoslavia unless 
Belgrade stopped its offensive in Kosovo , the 
representatives of the parties involved in the conflict 
were invited to peace talks in Rambouillet, France. 
It is important to recall the enormous effort 
made by NATO and the international community to 
avoid military intervention over KOSOVO, while 
making clear to President Milosevic its ultimate 
preparedness to use force, if necessary. 
Experience had taught that diplomacy without the 
threat of force would be wasted on him. In the 
spring of 1998, NATO ministers called on all 
parties to seek a peaceful resolution to the 
crisis, while directing the Alliance's military 
authorities to prepare options for the use of 
force, should it prove necessary. (...) To 
strengthen these initiatives the North Atlantic 
Council on 13 October authorised activation 
orders for air strikes against Yugoslavia, in a 
further attempt to convince President Milosevic 
to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and to co- 
operate in bringing an end to the violence. 
By the end of January 1999, the Contact Group on 
the former Yugoslavia (France, Germany, Italy, 
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
agreed to convene talks between the parties to 
the conflict. NATO supported this initiative by 
issuing a warning to both sides of the conflict 
and agreeing to the use of air strikes, if 
required. On 6 February, the parties met at 
Rambouillet, outside Paris, to discuss a peace 
I 
~ agreement. 47 
4 6  KOSOVO ONE YEAR ON Achievement and Challenge - Background t o  the crisis Available 
[Online]: chttp://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2OOO/backgrou.htm~ 112 May 19991. 
47  KOSOVO ONE YEAR ON Achievement and Challenge - Background t o  the cr i s i s  Available 
[Online] : chttp://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2OOO/backgrou.htm~ [12 May 19991. 
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In Rambouillet a so-called interim agreement was 
initiated, which would have seriously restricted Belgrade’s 
control over the province in order to establish a peaceful 
environment in Kosovo. Initially both parties had serious 
concerns about the agreement, but finally the ethnic 
Albanians accepted the plan, while the Serbian side still 
rejected it. 
The talks lasted 17 days with a follow-on session 
in Paris in mid-March. The proposals offered 
both sides a great deal, but also required major 
concessions. The Kosovar Albanians were offered 
considerable autonomy, ensured by the presence of 
a NATO-led force, but no independence. The Serbs 
were asked to concede autonomy, but not 
sovereignty, with KOSOVO’ s ultimate status left 
open. Unfortunately, despite the enormous 
efforts of the international community and the 
decision by the Kosovar Albanian delegation to 
sign the Rambouillet Accords, the Yugoslav 
delegation refused to do so. It is clear the 
Yugoslav government never seriously sought a 
negotiated peace at Ramb~uillet.~~ 
After several weeks of further negotiations to 
persuade Belgrade to accept the terms of the Rambouillet 
agreement a final rejection was received from the Serbian 
side. Having been firm in its resolve to prevent the Serbs 
from committing another act of genocide, even inside their 
own borders, NATO launched its first air strikes against 
Yugoslavia on the 24th of March, with the purpose of 
~~~ ~~ 
48 KOSOVO ONE YEAR ON Achievement and Challenge - Background t o  the c r i s i s  Available 
[Online]: chttp://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2OOO/backgrou.htm> [12 May 19991. 
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obtaining Belgrade’s full compliance with the terms of the 
interim agreement. 
After one final attempt by Richard Holbrooke to 
convince President Milosevic to reverse his 
policies, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, 
knowing diplomacy had run its course, gave the 
order to commence Operation Allied Force. 
This fateful decision followed months of intense 
political negotiation and calls on Yugoslavia by 
the United Nations, the Contact Group, the G8 
countries, and others to halt the repression and 
acts of violence that were provoking an ever- 
worsening humanitarian crisis. The Yugoslav 
regime’s reckless disregard of these appeals and 
its campaign of terror against its own 
population, in direct violation of the most 
basic, internationally agreed standards of 
humanitarian conduct, and the failure of all 
diplomatic efforts to find a political solution, 
left NATO no option but to use force.49 
C. THE NEW NATO MEMBERS AND THE KOSOVO OPERATION 
Participating in Operation Allied Force as members of 
NATO but not having fighting units in it, the situation of 
the Czech Republic and Poland was similar to Hungary‘s in 
many ways, although these two countries did not have those 
special concerns towards the operation as Hungary did. The 
start of the air campaign 12 days after their accession to 
the Alliance meant that the period of celebration turned 
out to be quite short for the three new members. 
4 9  KOSOVO ONE YEAR ON Achievement and Challenge - Background t o  the crisis Available 
[Online] : chttp://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2OOO/backgrou.htm> [12 May 19991. 
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The public support as well as the official backing of 
the air campaign was the most solid in Poland. Although in 
September 1998, the three Defense Ministers of the future 
members had agreed that they would not take part in any 
possible military intervent ion in KOSOVO~~, during the air 
strikes the Poles offered to contribute some troops in the 
PO tent ial ground offensive, which finally did not take 
place. 
Among the three new members the Czech Republic was the 
weakest link. Though President Have1 supported the NATO 
campaign, the governing Social Democrats were very 
lukewarm, while the former prime minister, Vaclav Klaus, 
opposed the air strike. "Of the three newcomers, Poland 
was the most enthusiastic about participating in the 
campaign against Serbia, but its armed forces are so poorly 
adapted to NATO's requirements that it was able to provide 
only token help with military transport. The Czech 
Republic , where public opinion about joining NATO was 
somewhat skeptical from the start, reacted to the air 
strikes with deep dismay."51 "The Czech Republic is the 
only one of the three countries where polls suggest more 
50  Czech News Agency, September 21 1998. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/WIRES/ 
(Czech and Hungary and Poland and Participation and Kosovo and Crisis) [April 15 20001. 
51 The Economist US  Edition, April 24 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/PAPERS/ 
(Czech and Public and Opinion and Kosovo and Crisis) [April 15 20001. 
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people oppose than support the campaign. (...) A recent poll 
by Czech Television showed nearly 50 percent of those 
questioned opposed the NATO bombings, 30 percent supported 
it and 20 percent didn’t have an opinion.”52 The Czechs’ 
passivity can be explained by historic motives. 
But the nation’s historic apathy toward war and 
weak answers from its government leaders on why 
Czechs should support the NATO bombings are at 
the root of the country‘s dissension, said Pave1 
Fischer, assistant director of foreign policy. 
“Czech history is different than Hungary or 
Poland, ’ Fischer said. ’Czech people do not 
have this conviction of protection and fighting 
for liberty and freedom. Czech representation 
also played an important role. They did not have 
enough strength in explaining to the people why 
we should support the situation in Kosovo. The 
first reaction was not very clear or sincere.‘53 
Both the Czechs and the Hungarians’ strongly opposed 
any participation in a possible ground attack. 
When it comes to ground troops, Hungarians and 
Czechs are dead against, particularly if their 
own troops are to be involved. Poles are 
somewhat less opposed, with 36 per cent of those 
asked in a recent survey saying they would 
support the use of ground troops. However, the 
/Czech/ Social Democrat government has ruled out 
the participation of Czech troops in any ground 
offensive. Jan Kavan, the Foreign Minister, 
said: ’I cannot imagine the Czech government 
agreeing to the Czech army’s participation in any 
kind of ground force operation of NATO member 
52 The Boston Globe, 1 May 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/PAPERS/ (Czech and 
Public and Opinion and Kosovo and Crisis) [April 15 20001. 
53 The Boston Globe, 1 May 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/PAPERS/ (Czech and 
Public and Opinion and Kosovo and Crisis) [April 15 20001. 
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states on the territory of Yugoslavia against the 
will of the Yugoslav go~ernment.~~ 
In conclusion though their general support and 
contribution to the operations was different the three new 
members fulfilled their obligations and did not jeopardize 
the cohesion of the Alliance. 
Financial T i m e s  London E d i t i o n ,  April 23 1999. p. 2 .  Available [online] : LEXIS- 
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V. HUNGARY’S PARTICIPATION IN THE KOSOVO OPERATION 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the following 
armed conflicts after 1990 turned the attention of the 
world to the Balkans again, and enhanced Hungary‘s 
geostrategic importance. Hungary’s proximity to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Kosovo - the latest operational theaters 
for NATO - made the country steadily more vital to the 
West. As the only NATO member bordering Yugoslavia, 
Hungary had special concerns during the campaign in spring 
of ’99.  The air strikes against Yugoslavia had a distinct 
resonance in Hungarian political life. For Hungarians 
Operation Allied Force primarily meant Vojvodina, not 
Kosovo. The future status of Kosovo could influence 
decisions about the status of Vojvodina, Hungarians noted. 
The leader of the far-right Hungarian Justice and Life 
Party, Istvan Csurka upheld his view: “ ... as the map of the 
region will probably be redrawn - it may be possible that a 
part of Vojvodina will be returned to Hungary, or that the 
area will receive autonomy to the extent that ensures the 
protection of ethnic Hungarians living there.”55 
55 MTI Hungarian News Agency MTI Econews April 21 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS- 
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A. HUNGARY‘S SPECIAL GEOSTRATEGIC AND STRATEGIC POSITION 
Hungary’s geostrategic importance was significantly 
enhanced during NATO‘s IFOR/SFOR Bosnia commitment, when 
Hungarian territory and infrastructure were used to support 
the peacekeeping operations. The airfield of Taszar in the 
southwestern part of Hungary was employed to support 
American and NATO aircraft and several military 
installations were made available for NATO.56 The Kosovo 
air campaign in 1999 intensified Hungary’s involvement. 
The Hungarian Parliament had authorized NATO to use the 
country’s airspace and airfields without any limitations as 
early as October 1998 and this parliamentary resolution was 
reiterated on 24 March 1999. 
The possibility of a ground attack against Serbia also 
gave Hungary huge importance. Though NATO officially 
excluded a ground attack, and the cohesion of the Alliance 
might have been seriously damaged by a decision to attack 
Serbia by employing ground troops, several Allies, 
particularly the British, strongly supported the idea of a 
ground operation. “Geographically, an assault from 
Hungary, north of Serbia, into Belgrade would be most 
56 NATO aircraft successively used the Hungarian airspace from 1992 in different UN and 
NATO operations. Earlier the Hungarian Parliament authorized NATO to use the Hungarian 
airspace during the Persian Gulf war in 1991. 
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inviting because it would take NATO forces across largely 
flat, open terrain, according to military specialist~.”~’ 
B. INDICATIONS OF A POLITICAL CRISIS 
Operation Allied Force caused much trouble in several 
NATO countries‘ domestic politics; the participation in the 
air campaign generated severe political debates, especially 
in Greece and Italy, and even in the United States. 
Hungary‘s above mentioned concerns towards the operations 
were reflected in an overheated domestic political 
situation, in which several previously constant features of 
the Hungarian political situation changed. The former 
national consensus on the main issues of foreign policy 
eroded, opposition parties both in parliament and outside 
doubted the government’s policy. The government was 
accused of being incapable of fully controlling Hungary’s 
situation in the changing environment. The public, which 
initially supported the NATO action, became more and more 
anxious58 and prominent members of the intelligentsia 
publicly opposed Hungary‘s participation in the 
57 The Washington Post,  April 14 1999. p.Al Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ 
(Ground Attack and Hungary and Belgrade) [16 March 20001. 
58  According to the public opinion poll performed by Median Inc. 55 per cent of the 
population felt that Hungary’s participation in the operations increased the chance of a 
possible retaliation attack by Serbia against Hungary. Heti Vilaggazdasag - HVG, 1 May 
1999. pp. 1-9. Available [Online]: http://www.hvg.hu 112 December 19991. 
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operations. 59 The representatives of the Hungarian 
community in Vojvodina blamed the Hungarian government of 
playing with the fate of ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia. 
Hungary's participation in the operation caused serious 
confrontations in the Hungarian-Russian relations as well. 
1. Disputes Over Certain Aspects of the Operation 
Support for the foreign policies of the Hungarian 
governments in 1989-98 was unanimous among the relevant 
political parties as well as among the population 
concerning the previously mentioned triple objectives. 
Hungary was the only one of the three new members to hold a 
referendum about the country's admission to NATO in 
November 1997, and 85 percent of the voters supported it. 
After 1998 this support changed due to causes at different 
events. In 1998 the right-wing Hungarian Justice and Life 
Party or MIEP, one of the political parties that had 
opposed Hungary's membership in NATO, got into the 
Hungarian Parliament, and hence gained more attention for 
its anti-NATO propaganda. The Hungarian Socialist Party or 
MSZP, the main force in the government in 1994-98, seemed 
5 9  Fifty Hungarian professionals and politicians set up the For the Peace of the Balkans 
movement, and issued an appeal on 1st May in Budapest to halt the Balkan war and end the 
bloodshed. "The Hungarian government should utilize its rights ensured by membership in 
NATO: with its veto right and constructive abstention, it should exercise pressure on its 
allies in order to prevent the spreading of the war to the neighbouring countries ..." MTI 
- Hungarian News Agency, 1 May 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/WIRES/ 
(Hungarian Opposition and Kosovo) [ 6  May 20001. 
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to change its mind during the NATO operation in March-June 
1999, and conditioned its support for the necessary 
resolutions with demands regarding domestic political 
issues. On May 5, 1999 Laszlo Kovacs, chairman of the MSZP 
announced that his party wanted to revise the March 24 
resolution: "This has made the parliamentary floor group of 
the Socialist Party to support an amendment to an earlier 
parliamentary resolution (approved in March) to rule out 
the possibility of NATO aircraft to attack Yugoslav targets 
from Hungarian airports."' On 31St May 1999 the Socialist 
party called for the withdrawal of the March resolution. 
"'We are seeking to modify the resolution that allowed NATO 
unlimited usage of Hungary's airspace and airbases. That 
would exclude air strikes from Hungarian territory,' 
Socialist party leader Laszlo Kovacs told reporters."61 
The non-parliamentary Workers' Party turned to the 
Constitutional Court, asking it to declare that the 
6o BBC Summary of World Broadcast May 5 1999. Available [Online] : 
LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ (Hungary and Airports and Attack and Serbia) [6 March 20001. 
Nepszabadsag, June 1 1999. Available [Online] : 
http://w;~~.nepszabadsag.hu/Redakcio/Doc.asp?SID=l&IID=1181&CID=lS~ID=5j586 [15 December 
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parliamentary resolution allowing NATO planes to use 
Hungarian airspace and airfields was unconstitutional.62 
The public had generally supported the NATO air 
campaign but the bombing of areas of Vojvodina populated 
with ethnic Hungarians and the possibility of a ground 
attack significantly decreased the level of support. 
Furthermore, two-thirds of the public solidly opposed any 
plan for a ground attack from Hungarian soil. The fate of 
the ethnic Hungarian minorities living in Vojvodina caused 
another fierce political debate in Hungary. Istvan Csurka, 
the ultra-nationalist chairman of MIEP, demanded a UN- 
supervised referendum on Hungary's re-annexation of 
northern Vojvodina. "Our standpoint is the same: we want a 
UN-monitored referendum to decide whether the majority of 
Vojvodina Hungarians should become part of their mother 
country once again. "63 Although Csurka' s views are 
extremely isolated, the Vojvodina question got on the 
official agenda of the Hungarian government, which promoted 
the autonomy plan to the international community proposed 
by the two political parties of the ethnic Hungarian 
minorities in Vojvodina. 
62 Hungar ian  News  A g e n c y  - MTI Available [Online] : http: //www.mti.hu/keres/ (Thiirmer) [18 
Februay 20001. 
63 BBC Monitoring Europe September 19 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ 
(Csurka and Vojvodina) [ 6  March 20001. 
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The Hungarian Foreign Ministry announced July 6 
that two political parties representing the 
ethnic Hungarian minority living in the Yugoslav 
province of Vojvodina had created an autonomy 
plan for the province. The plan, introduced at a 
meeting in Budapest between the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ) and the Vojvodina 
Hungarian Democratic Party (VMDP) that was 
mediated by the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 
outlines three possible levels of autonomy for 
Vojvodina Hungarians: personal autonomy, local 
autonomy, and territorial autonomy. Personal 
autonomy would involve personal rights granted 
due to ethnic status, such as language rights. 
Local autonomy would mean granting rights to 
i’ndividual ethnic Hungarian communities such as 
local police forces and village self-government. 
Territorial autonomy for the whole province would 
be a return to the autonomy Vojvodina had before 
1989. 64 
Concerns about Vojvodina and the fate of the ethnic 
Hungarians living in the province caused difficulties for 
the Hungarian government during the decision-making in the 
Alliance as well. As a newcomer and one of the weakest 
allies, not actively participating in the conduct of the 
air operations, Hungary could not hope to have much 
influence in the decision-making process. However, 
Hungary’s special situation gave the representatives of the 
country some extra rights, and the Alliance took Hungarian 
sensitivities into account whenever it could, though 
expecting Hungary’s full-support in the operations. 
64 “Hungary Supports Vojvodina Autonomy Plan“ STRATFOR Commentary September 7 1999. 
Available [Online] : 
~http://w~ur.stratfor.com/cis/commentary/c9907070230.htm~ [March 26 20001. 
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Hungary has made it clear that it is concerned, 
let me put it that way, with obviously the fate 
of the Hungarian ethnic community in the 
Voyvadina, and we are mindful of that as well. 
But having said that, Hungary is showing all of 
the support that you would expect. (...)Hungary is 
as much part of this operation as any other ally 
and all requests that we have made to the 
Hungarian government for support have been 
granted up until now and we expect that to be the 
case in the future.65 
2. Momentary Lapse of the Multiparty Consensus on 
Foreign Policy 
Hungarian foreign policy has been characterized by 
remarkable continuity over the last ten years. The 
principal objectives of this foreign policy - Hungary's 
accession to EU and NATO, the buildup of good relations 
with the neighboring countries, and support for the ethnic 
Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary - were 
supported by a consensus of the main political parties 
until the 1998 elections. The elections of 1998 generated 
several changes concerning this consensus. The two parties 
of the coalition government of 1994-98, which had a 
significant role during the negotiations concerning 
Hungary's accession to NATO, lost the election and became 
the opposition. During the NATO air campaign these two 
parties - the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the 
~ 
6 5  
NEXIS/ARCNWS/MAJPAP (Domestic Politics and Hungary and Kosovo) [May 18 20001. 
NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea in CNN Live Event, April 25 1999, Available[Online] : LEXIS- 
5 0  
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) - started to condition 
their support for the necessary resolutions with demands 
regarding domestic political issues. In April 1999 they 
withdrew their support for a bill which would authorize the 
government to allow foreign troops to enter Hungary, after 
the governing coalition parties had rejected deputies 
delegated by the opposition to two parliamentary 
investigation committees. In May 1999 the Socialist Party 
tried to amend an earlier parliamentary decision on the 
unlimited use of Hungarian airspace and airfields by NATO, 
claiming that the government had not informed the 
Parliament in detail about NATO’s planned steps. 
The 1998 election meant not only the end of the MSZP- 
SZDSZ coalition, but the appearance of the far-right 
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) in the Hungarian 
Parliament as well. The MIEP’s presence in the Parliament 
had significant effects. Opposing Hungary’s NATO 
membership, the MIEP questioned the foundations of the 
established foreign policy, and as a parliamentary party 
gained more attention to its anti-NATO propaganda. During 
the Kosovo campaign the chairman of MIEP, Istvan Csurka, 
demanded a UN-supervised referendum on Hungary’s re- 
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annexation of northern Vojvodina. Csurka's views were 
sharply criticized by all the other parliamentary parties, 
and the Hungarian government officially dissociated itself 
from the MIEP's territorial demands and ideas on the 
revision of borders. 
3. Bombing of Vojvodina and its Effects on the Public 
"Although not participating in the raids, Budapest has 
allowed the use of its air space for the bombing. From the 
beginning, Hungarian officials have tried to make it clear 
to NATO strategists that Budapest cannot and does not want 
to go any further, taking into account its geographical 
situation, historical experience and the interests of the 
400,000-strong Hungarian minority in Serbia's Vojvodina 
region. However, such concerns do not seem to have been 
taken into account by NATO military commanders, who have 
ordered the destruction of bridges and historical buildings 
in Vojvodina's capital Novi Sad, thus making Budapest Is 
position even more uncomfortable. r r 6 6  Opinions like this did 
not make easier the task of the Hungarian government to 
maintain the support of the main political forces and the 
public during the air strikes. Jozsef Kasza, the mayor of 
66 "War i n  t h e  Balkans T e s t s  Hungary's L o y a l t i e s "  Inter Press Service, April 23,1999. 
Available [Online] : L E X I S - N E X I S / N E W S / C V S /  (Bombing and Vojvodina and Hungarians) [7 
March 20001. 
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Szabadka/Subotica, a Vojvodina town mostly populated by 
ethnic Hungarians, wrote a letter to the NATO Secretary 
General, Javier Solana, and the Hungarian Prime Minister, 
Viktor Orban, after his town had been bombed by NATO; and 
this letter also contributed to the hardship of the 
Hungarian government. "Subotica did not deserve this fate. 
A multi-ethnic, multicultural community has been struck. 
It could boast a high tolerance level, which is now deemed 
vanishing. N 6 7  In an interview he also warned, "Hungary 
should fulfill its NATO obligations without sacrificing the 
Vojvodina Hungarians. " 6 8  
To solve these difficulties the public information 
strategy of the Hungarian government towards the public 
considerably improved during the first weeks of the air 
campaign. At the beginning of the air war the main 
emphasis of this strategy was to assure the population that 
Hungary was not in any kind of danger because of its 
involvement in the operations. After .this initial phase 
the population received more detailed and reasonable 
explanations about the necessity of attacking certain 
"War in the Balkans Tests Hungary's Loyalties" Inter Press Service, April 23 1999. 
Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ (Bombing and Vojvodina and Hungarians) 17 
March 20001. 
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objectives, even in Vojvodina. The success of this 
strategy was shown in the results of the survey conducted 
after the bombing of Vojvodina, when 53% of the population 
supported the air campaign, and only 27% were against it.69 
The strategy of the government needed to be improved 
in communications with the parliamentary parties as well. 
After the initial disagreement with the Socialist Party and 
the Alliance of Free Democrats, the coalition returned to 
the practice of continuous six-party consultation, which 
calmed down the opposition. The radical Hungarian Justice 
and Life Party and its chairman remained in strict 
opposition despite all these government efforts. 
4. The Ground Attack Scenarios and Their Implications 
The scenarios of a ground attack against Serbia 
envisaged three available directions of attack. If the 
objective of the attack was KOSOVO, it would be conducted 
from staging areas in Macedonia or Albania. For an attack 
against Milosevic’s power center in Belgrade the most 
favorable base of operations would be Hungary. 
The initial position of the Hungarian government was 
that neither air nor ground attacks would be launched from 
6 9  Heti Vilaggazdasag - HVG, 3 April 1999. pp. 3-9 Available [Online] : http://www.hvg.hu 
[12 December 19991. 
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Hungarian soil or airspace, nor would Hungary send troops 
to Yugoslavia. According to Heti Vilaggazdasag (HVG) , one 
of the most reliable weeklies in Hungary, the Hungarian 
government sent several messages to Belgrade in March, in 
which it informed the Yugoslav government about the depth 
of the obligations Hungary had undertaken, and signaled 
Hungary's will not to send t roops  to Yugoslavia. In 
exchange Hungary required Belgrade not to send ethnic 
Hungarian conscripts and policemen to KOSOVO.~' 
This initial position was first challenged by NATO in 
the first days of May, when the Alliance decided to deploy 
24 F/A-18 fighter-bombers in Hungary, to expand its forces 
in the zone of operations. This decision was the cause of 
the Socialist Party's (MSZP) disapproval discussed above. 
The chairman of the MSZP doubted that the government was in 
full control of the situation, and suspected that Hungary 
could drift into a more direct combat role. 
On the question of ground attack against Yugoslavia 
from Hungarian soil the government stood firmly. 
"Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi said on Thursday 
that Hungary would not be used as a rear base for NATO 
ground troops going into neighboring Yugoslavia. Speaking 
70 Heti V i l a g g a z d a s a g  - HVG, 20 March 1999. Available [Online]: http://www.hvg.hu 112 
December 19991. 
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to the BBC, he said that 'it is not something we would 
support.' Asked if it meant that Hungary was ruling out 
"now and forever" that NATO troops would be allowed to 
enter Yugoslavia from its territory, he said yes. 'There's 
no way that it would ever be considered.'"71 
Historical experience also boosted the revulsion in 
the Hungarian public towards the ground attack against 
Belgrade from Hungarian soil, since it would have resembled 
the April 1941 operations by the Werma~ht.~~ 
Fortunately the NATO air campaign by June proved 
successful and there was no need to test the firmness of 
the Hungarian government on this question. 
5. The  Vojvodina Problem and its Implications 
As already noted the most serious concerns of the 
Hungarian government were induced by the fate of the ethnic 
Hungarian minority living in Vojvodina. Learning the 
lessons of the previous post-Yugoslav wars, when the 
reservists of ethnic Hungarian background had been called 
for duty in much higher proportion than their ratio in the 
71 Agence France Presse, April 29 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ 
(Hungary and Airports and Attack and Serbia) [6 March 20001. 
72 An account of the April 1941 campaign against Yugoslavia by the Axis powers is: George 
Blau, Invasion Balkans: The German Campaign in the Balkans, Spring 1941 (Shippersburg, 
1997) 
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population, the Hungarian government contacted Belgrade in 
August 1998 to prevent similar actions. “Hungary has 
emphatically asked that the Belgrade authorities should not 
send to Kosovo soldiers and policemen belonging to the 
ethnic Hungarian minority of Vojvodina. Hungarian 
Parliamentary State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Zsolt 
Nemeth summoned Balsa Spadijer, ambassador of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in Budapest, to his office for this 
purpose. In the meeting, Nemeth reiterated the Hungarian 
ministry’s concern over the escalation of the Kosovo 
crisis, and the deployment of Vojvodina Hungarian 
conscripts, reservists and policemen in Kosovo. “73 The 
local Hungarian communities of Vojvodina shared these 
fears: ”The Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians have called 
for civil disobedience on 3 August that young ethnic 
Hungarian males should not answer their draft notices from 
the Yugoslav authorities. This is in order to protest the 
several hundred new draft notices just received by Ethnic 
Hungarians in Vojv~dina.”~~ 
73 BBC Worldwide Monitoring - Monitoring Europe, August 6 1998. Available [Online] : 
LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CVS/ (Hungary and Hungarian and Ethnic and Minorities) [6 March 
20001. 
74 Hungarian Lobby “Letters to News Media” Available [Online] : 
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Hungary' s concerns regarding the Hungarian ethnic 
group could be justified by the fears of a possible 
retaliation against them in the course of the NATO air 
campaign. As the already quoted Jozsef Kasza summarized, 
" ... the Serb public regards Hungary as an enemy, and this 
endangers the Vojvodina Hungarian community. Serb 
extremists are much more dangerous for us than the NATO 
raids. The Serbs are near us, live w i t h  
During the air campaign Hungary tried to prevent the 
bombing of the territories populated by ethnic Hungarians, 
but Budapest's concerns obviously were not considered every 
time . 
Further implications of the Vojvodina issue are 
connected with the future status of the province. From 
1974 Vojvodina had an autonomous status inside Serbia; and 
this was annulled by Milosevic in 1989, in the same way as 
in the case of Kosovo. The fact that the NATO operation 
would influence the future status of Kosovo generated 
similar hopes among Hungarians living in Vojvodina and in 
Hungary. The most extreme conception of the revision of 
the borders by the chairman of the MIEP has already been 
discussed. There were more moderate ideas about this 
75 Agence France Presse, April 08 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ 
(Hungary and Hungarian and Ethnic and Minorities) [6 March 20001. 
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issue, and the Hungarian government decided to keep them on 
its agenda. The linkage of the problems did not gain 
support among the NATO allies. "The Hungarians' ambitious 
plans for Vojvodina have already received a cold welcome in 
the United States. Hungarian ambassador to the United 
States, Geza Jeszenszky, told the Hungarian government this 
week (July 29, 1999) that Washington is aware of 
Vojvodina's demands but 'if the issue was to be raised now, 
it would make things only more difficult for Milosevic's 
opposition.' Jeszenszky added that it has been clear 
throughout the Kosovo conflict that the U.S. policy is to 
concentrate on one problem at one time, indicating that 
Vojvodina may be off the table for now."76 
The concept of the "three level autonomy", which is 
officially supported by the Hungarian government, was 
worked out by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) (. 
It contains three different levels of autonomy: on the 
level of individual rights; in local administration where 
ethnic Hungarians are in the majority; and reconstitution 
of autonomy for the province as a whole. Hungary hoped to 
receive support for the Vojvodina Hungarians at the EU's 
76 
Available [Online]: http://mw.cdi.org/weekly/l999/issue29.htrnl I12 December 19991. 
"Hungarian Steps and Missteps in Kosovo" Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 3 Issue # 29 
5 9  
Southeastern Europe Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo in 
July 1 9 9 9 .  
The Hungarian government has officially announced 
it would promote the Vojvodina autonomy plan at a 
European Union summit taking place later this 
month in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Hungarian Foreign 
Minister Janos Martonyi said in a July 4 
interview for the Duna TV satellite service that 
the autonomy plan for Vojvodina should become 
part of political and economic reconstruction of 
Yugoslavia. Martonyi said the Vojvodina question 
should be "put on the agenda now, because now is 
the time to put the issue of Yugoslavia's 
democratization on the agenda. According to 
Martonyi, territorial autonomy would be the most 
difficult to achieve, no matter how "fine and 
pleasing the idea is." The Hungarian Foreign 
Minister said implementation of self-government 
for Hungarian communities in Vojvodina would be 
more realistic.77 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has told 
leaders at the Sarajevo summit that Hungary will 
not accept any agreement on the future of 
Yugoslavia, which does not provide legal and 
institutional protection for minorities. He said 
that such protection, especially in the form of 
autonomy, would prevent future crises in the 
region. 78 
Finally, the Summit approved the Balkan Stability 
Pact, demanding respect for minority rights; but it did not 
mention Vojvodina and the Hungarian minority. 
BBC monitoring Europe, 5 July 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ 77 
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6. Conflicts with Russia 
“NATO enlargement i s  a b i g  mistake,  poss ib ly  the 
Former Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov 
biggest  mistake since the end of the  Second Wor ld  War.’’ 
Hungary’s participation in the NATO campaign against 
Serbia has contributed to the growing tension between 
Hungary and Russia. Hungary’s Atlantic ambitions had 
earlier been strongly opposed by Russia - as Moscow was 
dead against the eastern enlargement of the Alliance. “One 
European country does, of course, have strong and entirely 
unambivalent feelings about NATO expansion. The entire 
Russian political class, representing all points of the 
political spectrum, opposes 
The NATO air campaign in Serbia evoked serious 
disagreement from Moscow which chilled the Russian- 
Hungarian relations as well. 
The real point is that these air strikes have 
come just days after Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic were ceremoniously admitted to 
NATO. From a Russian point of view, it is pretty 
hard to stomach that NATO should launch its ‘first 
offensive action in Europe so soon after 
recruiting Russia’s former allies.80 
7 9  Mandelbaum, M., “NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century” Available 
[Online] : 
http://~v~~.cpss.org/nato/mande197.htm [25 March 20001. 
The Daily Telegraph (London) 26 March 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS- 
NEXIS/NEWS/PAPERS/ (Domestic Politics and Hungary and Kosovo) 118 May 20001. 
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The stopping of a Russian-Belorussian convoy during the 
campaign in April containing humanitarian aid, fuel and 
armored trucks for Yugoslavia ignited the tension. The 
incident irritated Russia, which reacted by calling back 
its ambassador to Budapest for consultations, and called 
off a scheduled official visit of Hungary’s foreign 
minister to Moscow. Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov 
threatened that the actions of the Hungarian authorities 
would have the most serious consequences for further 
Russian-Hungarian relations.” 
Moscow’s embarrassment was further boosted in June 
“when the Hungarian Parliament approved opening an air 
corridor over its territory for flights of units of the 
KFOR, but the approval did not apply to Russia’s forces 
wishing to overfly Hungary. Hungary officially did not 
consider the Russian unit in Kosovo a legitimate KFOR unit, 
until the settlement of the disagreement over Russia’s role 
in KFOR.”82 This Russian overflight request would have 
served to transport a contingent of 2,500 Russian 
paratroopers as reinforcement for the Russian forces, which 
had seized the Pristina airport some days earlier. Since 
‘I BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, April 20 1999. Available [Online] : 
LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/ARCNWS/ (Domestic Politics and Hungary and Kosovo) [18 May 20001. 
82 United Press International, June 16 1999. Available [online] : 
LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ (Hungary and Russia and Overfly) [18 March 20001. 
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Hungary denied approving the Russian request, Moscow tried 
to get permission to overfly from Romania and Bulgaria, but 
both countries rejected the Russian request. Hence the 
secret plan, as Zbigniew Brzezinski called Milosevic’s 
attempt for partitioning Kosovo with the help of the 
Russians, did not work. “It thus appears that Milosevic’s 
sudden acquiescence was part of a desperate double-cross 
attempt engineered jointly by Belgrade and Moscow. The 
collusion was contrived to outwit NATO by salvaging for 
Serbia - -  under Russia’s protection - -  the northeastern 
part of partitioned Kosovo, and to gain for frustrated 
Russia a significant boost in international prestige. The 
attempt faltered because three small European countries had 
the gumption to defy Moscow, and NATO remained firm in not 
agreeing to a separate Russian sector. Under these 
circumstances, the double-cross did not w~rk.”*~ 
A more serious scandal in Hungarian-Russian relations 
burst out in November ’99 after the Hungarian PM‘s 
statement about the possibility of deploying U.S. nuclear 
weapons on Hungarian territory in a crisis situation. 
Viktor Orban spoke about this possibility during his 
official visit to Canada. The Russian reaction was 
83 
6, 1999. Available [Online]: http://wm.csis.orq/hill/ts991006zb.html [lo May 20001. 
Testimony of Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 
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extremely harsh. Orbsn's statement was perceived as a 
direct violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which 
NATO had confirmed that it had no intention, plan, or 
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the 
new members. "It would be a direct violation of the 
cooperation accord signed between Russia and NATO under 
which the Alliance declared it had neither projects nor 
intentions to deploy weapons on the territory of its new 
members," said Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir 
Rakhmanin. "This directly confirms Russia's disquiet over 
NATO enlargement. 'IE4 
84 Agence France Presse, November 03 1999. Available [Online] : 
LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/CURNWS/ (Hungarian and Russian and Relations) [7 March 20001 
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VI. ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HUNGARY'S FUTURE 
ROLE - LESSONS LEARNED 
Hungary would like to play an active role in the 
Balkan settlement process. The Hungarian government has 
stated several times Hungary's ambitions to become a 
regional center of the South Eastern European security 
framework. As a new member of NATO, Hungary has several 
challenges at hand, and its active involvement in this 
regional security process may strengthen its position in 
the Alliance. The effort of the present coalition in 
Hungary to link the settlement of the status of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina seems unlikely to be successful. Hungary's new 
partners are not willing to create a new precedent for 
emerging ethnic separatism that could emerge from the 
example of an autonomous Vojvodina. Hungary has to 
continue its good neighborly policy and help Yugoslavia to 
integrate into the Euro-Atlantic framework and promote the 
idea of "traversable borders". 
The Kosovo crisis abruptly cut off the honeymoon 
period of the new members in NATO, and made Hungary a 
front-line country. Hungary's special situation in the 
crisis - being in the vicinity of the operations, seeing 
ethnic Hungarians as victims of the bombing of Vojvodina, 
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though only as so-called "collateral damages"- caused 
severe difficulties for the government, which was attacked 
by the parliamentary opposition as well as by political 
parties outside the parliament and by several public 
opinion leaders. Fortunately, when the air operations 
started the government coalition was still "in full 
strength", the debates that divided the coalition came 
forward in a later period. During the Kosovo crisis of 
March-June 1999, the Hungarian government did not need the 
support of the far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party 
to get a bill through, which recently have already 
occurred. Despite some previously mentioned discontent the 
public generally supported the government's policy, even 
after the bombing of Subotica. During the air operations 
the Hungarian government recognized the need to reconsider 
its original position and allowed the use of the Hungarian 
airspace for attacking maneuvers as well. 
The new NATO partner most caught up in 
unanticipated decision-making is Hungary, the 
only member of the alliance sharing a common 
border with Serbia. Not only will Hungary and 
Serbia remain neighbors long after the Kosovo 
crisis is over, but their relationship is further 
complicated by the fact that 300,000 ethnic 
Hungarians 1 ive in Vojvodina, Serbia s 
northernmost province. Hungary has no desire to 
give Milosevic an excuse to extend his ethnic 
cleansing. So Hungary's initial reaction to 
NATO's engagement with Serbia was one of caution, 
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taking the position that neither its territory 
nor troops would be made available to NATO. 
But as the extent of Milosevic I s assault against 
the Kosovars became clear, Hungary realized that 
its NATO membership is primarily a commitment to 
Western values, not geography or ethnicity. 
These values are the keystone in the architecture 
Hungary has demonstrated its fundamental 
commitment to NATO by agreeing to provide the 
unrestricted use of its airspace for NATO planes, 
and in the last few days offering the use of air 
bases, principally Taszar in Southern Hungary, to 
NATO. 
of Hungary's peaceful, democratic future. so 
This maneuvering space of the Hungarian government has been 
considerably reduced since the end of the Kosovo campaign 
because of the debates inside the governing coalition and 
the sharpening of the domestic political situation.86 
Consequently, the political crisis that was caused by the 
Kosovo campaign could not be again handled in the manner 
that it previously was; the weakened. coalition would not be 
85 The New York Post, 4 June 1999. Available [Online] : 
LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/ALLNWS/ (Hungarian Government and KOSOVO Crisis) [7  May 20001. 
86 The domestic political situation in Hungary is well-characterized by Peter FiM of the 
Washington Post writing about the Hungarian PM. "Orban came to power in 1998, his 
conservative Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz)-Hungarian Civic Party forming a 
coalition with two other right-wing parties. It has been an eventful debut. Orban has 
successfully weathered a series of crises--including the Russian economic collapse that 
shook central Europe, and the war in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The latter was 
particularly sensitive for Hungary, a new member of NATO, because a large ethnic 
Hungarian minority lives in northern Serbia, the dominant republic of Yugoslavia. The 
economy righted itself and Hungary provided full logistical support for NATO operations 
against Yugoslavia. 
Outside the hothouse of Hungary's domestic politics and the merits of any individual 
dispute, Orban's political battles, especially successive standoffs with Demszky over 
infrastructure projects in the capital, seem most revealing of the prime minister's 
ideological DNA: his abiding distrust of the left; his suspicion of the Budapest elite; 
his desire to cleave the country's politics into clear-cut left and right parties; and 
his willingness to get in anyone's face to achieve his goals." Washington Post Foreign 
Service, 30 January 2000. p. A18. 
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able to resolve these problems, hence a similar crisis 
would cause much deeper political crisis in Hungary. 
68 
VII.CONCLUSIONS 
FADING HOPES AND ILLUSIONS 
Hungary has had some unjustified hopes about its 
future role in the Balkans settlement process. Hungary 
championed the interests of the Vojvodina ethnic 
Hungarians, and unsuccessfully tried to get support for 
their autonomy plan. Hungary has envisioned a much greater 
role for itself in the Southeastern Europe Stability 
process as well. Hungary has had some illusions about 
receiving some rebuilding contracts in Kosovo as 
compensation after the air campaign. "Instead of cash, the 
international community may compensate Hungary by 
guaranteeing its involvement in the reconstruction of 
Yugoslavia, including KOSOVO" - declared the Hungarian 
Foreign Minister. 87 
The awakening process has already started. "Hungary 
is not in a position to play the role of a superpower in 
the region, so it must acquiesce to the fact it is unable 
to influence decisions such as the direction of NATO's 
87 Extel Examiner, 15 June 1999. Available [Online] : LEXIS-NEXIS/NEWS/ALLNWS/ (Hungary 
and KOSOVO Compensate) [7 March 20001. 
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military attacks, the location of reconstruction 
headquarters or the progress of peace talks.”ee - summarized 
Gyula Molnar, MP of the opposition Socialist Party. 
The Kosovo operation was a unique exercise for NATO in 
many aspects as well. For the first time in its history 
NATO, according to the new Strategic Concept, accomplished 
a “humanitarian intervention”, a non-Article 5 mission to 
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to stop an apparent 
act of genocide. Operation Allied Force was the first 
operation of the 19-member Alliance. The political unity 
of the 19 members had to be maintained during the 11-week 
campaign by taking the different interests of the member 
states into consideration. The Alliance‘s decision to 
attack a sovereign country without the explicit 
authorization of the UN Securit.y Council created a 
precedent in international law. Experts are debating the 
consequences of this decision; many question the legitimacy 
of the use of force against Yugoslavia, while others 
consider it reasonable. There are differences in views 
even among the NATO members about the necessity of a UNSC 
authorization in forming the legal basis of the operation. 
’’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring - Monitoring Europe, 19 September 1999. Available [Online] : 
L E X I S - N E X I S / N E W S / C V S /  (Hungary and L e s s o n s  and Kosovo Crisis) [ 7  May 20001. 
70 
Operation Allied Force achieved its goals in that it 
made possible an interim settlement. The United Nations 
Security Council approved a resolution - UNSCR 1244 - that 
specified general principles on the political solution to 
the Kosovo crises. The future settlement of the status of 
Kosovo will be decided within the framework of the existing 
European security institutions like NATO, the OSCE, the EU 
and initiatives like the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe. 
While the problem of Hungarians living outside of the 
nation's borders remains a feature of domestic politics and 
a latent problem of the European system of states, the 
events interpreted here reveal that the general problem of 
war and nationalism in the European experience has perhaps 
entered a new phase in the new century with the results of 
the Kosovo crisis. In this regard the role of multi-national 
organizations, which adhere not solely to a naked exercise 
of power-political interests on the model of the European 
dynasties, stands in uneasy relation to what is claimed by 
many to be the new ideal of humanitarian intervention. Only 
time will tell the degree to which these events truly signal 
something new in policy and strategy, but surely new for 
NATO and its members (especially its newest members) was the 
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waging of war on the continent of Europe, even if only for a 
few weeks. Hungarians had to learn this lesson quickly and 
with little preparation. Yet the outcome was surely better 
than many critics feared, not the least of whom were 
vociferous doubters of NATO Enlargement in the US, who 
assert that Europeans in central, eastern and southern 
Europe tend to blood thirst and revanchism on the old scale. 
To be sure, Hungary found itself unable to influence 
the full diplomatic course of events connected with the 
violent collapse of ex-Yugoslavia. The resources available 
to national diplomacy and policy in the face of a concerted 
effort by the leading Euro-Atlantic democracies proved 
limited, indeed. However, the aspects of domestic politics 
in a democratic setting in the midst of crisis offered a 
new, democratic Hungary a set of lessons in matters long 
familiar to the other NATO democracies about the impact of 
policy and strategy on domestic politics and vice versa. 
Critics have overstated the imperatives of unity of opinion 
and effort in NATO and misunderstood the importance of 
allowing a full range of democratic political forces to play 
out, even in the midst of such a profound crisis as that in 
Kosovo in 1998-99 and its implications for a new Hungary. 
While this baptism of fire was unpleasant and filled with 
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unhappy and tense moments, which may have highlighted the 
limits of national policy on the pattern of traditional 
sovereignty and statecraft, one can imagine far more 
dreadful outcomes, which, one may be thankful, did not take 
place. The Hungarian experience of the Kosovo crisis points 
in two directions at once : either toward a peaceful future 
of a multi-lateral resolution of conflict (which may include 
armed force on a multi-national basis of limited endurance) 
or the solutions put in hand in the era 1919-1939 and again 
in certain quarters in the years of the1990s which led to 
the Kosovo crisis, itself. The imperatives that arise from 
this choice must, in turn, be digested and internalized by 
the democratic societies of the West. In this regard, 
Hungary has done its part. 
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